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A
s society pours more resources 
into medical research, it will 
increasingly realize that the 
research “payback” always represents a 
mixture of false and true ﬁ  ndings. This 
tradeoff is similar to the tradeoff seen 
with other societal investments—for 
example, economic development can 
lead to environmental harms while 
measures to increase national security 
can erode civil liberties. In most of the 
enterprises that deﬁ  ne modern society, 
we are willing to accept these tradeoffs. 
In other words, there is a threshold (or 
likelihood) at which a particular policy 
becomes socially acceptable.
In the case of medical research, we 
can similarly try to deﬁ  ne a threshold 
by asking: “When should potentially 
false research ﬁ  ndings become 
acceptable to society?” In other words, 
at what probability are research 
ﬁ  ndings determined to be sufﬁ  ciently 
true and when should we be willing to 
accept the results of this research?
Deﬁ  ning the “Threshold 
Probability”
As in most investment strategies, 
our willingness to accept particular 
research ﬁ  ndings will depend on the 
expected payback (the beneﬁ  ts) and 
the inadvertent consequences (the 
harms) of the research. We begin by 
deﬁ  ning a “positive” ﬁ  nding in research 
in the same way that Ioannidis deﬁ  ned 
it [1]. A positive ﬁ  nding occurs when 
the claim for an alternative hypothesis 
(instead of the null hypothesis) can be 
accepted at a particular, pre-speciﬁ  ed 
statistical signiﬁ  cance. The probability 
that a research result is true (the 
posterior probability; PPV) depends 
on: (1) the probability of it being true 
before the study is undertaken (the 
prior probability), (2) the statistical 
power of the study, and (3) the 
statistical signiﬁ  cance of the research 
result. The PPV may also be inﬂ  uenced 
by bias [1,4], i.e., by systematic 
misrepresentation of the research due 
to inadequacies in the design, conduct, 
or analysis [1].
However, the calculation of PPV 
tells us nothing about whether a 
particular research result is acceptable 
to researchers or not. Nevertheless, 
it can be shown that there is some 
probability (the “threshold probability,” 
pt) above which the results of a study 
will be sufﬁ  cient for researchers 
to accept them as “true” [3]. The 
threshold probability will depend 
on the ratio of net beneﬁ  ts/harms 
(B/H) that is generated by the study 
[3,5,6]. Mathematically the relationship 
between pt and B/H can be expressed 
as (see Appendix, Equation A1):
     
(1)
We deﬁ  ne net beneﬁ  t as the 
difference between the values of the 
outcomes of the action taken under 
the research hypothesis and the null 
hypothesis, respectively (when in fact 
the research hypothesis is true). Net 
harms are deﬁ  ned as the difference 
between the values of the outcomes of 
the action taken under the null and the 
research hypotheses, respectively (when 
in fact the null hypothesis is true) [3]. 
It follows that if the PPV is above pt 
we can rationally accept the results 
of the research ﬁ  ndings. Similarly, if 
the PPV is below pt we should accept 
the null hypothesis. Note that the 
research payoffs (the beneﬁ  ts) and 
the inadvertent consequences (harms) 
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Summary
Ioannidis estimated that most 
published research ﬁ  ndings are false 
[1], but he did not indicate when, if at 
all, potentially false research results 
may be considered as acceptable to 
society. We combined our two previously 
published models [2,3] to calculate 
the probability above which research 
ﬁ  ndings may become acceptable. A new 
model indicates that the probability 
above which research results should 
be accepted depends on the expected 
payback from the research (the beneﬁ  ts) 
and the inadvertent consequences (the 
harms). This probability may dramatically 
change depending on our willingness to 
tolerate error in accepting false research 
ﬁ  ndings. Our acceptance of research 
ﬁ  ndings changes as a function of what 
we call “acceptable regret,” i.e., our 
tolerance of making a wrong decision 
in accepting the research hypothesis. 
We illustrate our ﬁ  ndings by providing a 
new framework for early stopping rules 
in clinical research (i.e., when should 
we accept early ﬁ  ndings from a clinical 
trial indicating the beneﬁ  ts as true?). 
Obtaining absolute “truth” in research is 
impossible, and so society has to decide 
when less-than-perfect results may 
become acceptable.
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in Equation 1 can be expressed in a 
variety of units. In clinical research 
these units would typically be length 
of life, morbidity or mortality rates, 
absence of pain, cost, and strength of 
individual or societal preference for a 
given outcome [3].
We can now frame the crucial 
question of interest as: What is the 
minimum B/H ratio for the given PPV 
for which the research hypothesis has a 
greater value than the null hypothesis? 
Mathematically, this will occur when 
(see Appendix, Equations A1 and A2):
         or 
             (2)
         
Calculation of the Threshold 
Probability of “Accepted Truth”
Figure 1 shows the threshold 
probability of “truth” (i.e., the 
probability above which the research 
ﬁ  ndings may be accepted) as a function 
of B/H associated with the research 
results. The graph shows that as long as 
the probability of “accepted truth” (a 
horizontal line) is above the threshold 
probability curve, the research ﬁ  ndings 
may be accepted. The higher the B/H 
ratio, the less certain we need to be of 
the truthfulness of the research results 
in order to accept them.
Note that we are following the classic 
decision theory approach to the results 
of clinical trials, which states that a 
rational decision maker should select 
the research versus the null hypothesis 
depending on which one maximizes 
the value of consequences [7–9]. In the 
parlance of expected utility decision 
theory, this means that we should 
choose the option with the higher 
expected utility [3,5,7–12]. (Expected 
utility is the average of all possible 
results weighted by their corresponding 
probabilities—see Appendix). In 
other words, the results of the research 
hypothesis should be accepted when the 
beneﬁ  t of the action outweigh its harms.
A Practical Example: When Should 
We Stop a Clinical Trial?
Interim analyses of clinical trials 
are challenging exercises in which 
researchers and/or data safety 
monitoring committees have to make 
a judgment as to whether to accept 
early promising results and terminate 
a trial or whether the trial should 
continue [13,14]. If the interim 
analysis shows signiﬁ  cant beneﬁ  t in 
efﬁ  cacy for the new treatment over 
the standard treatment, continuing to 
enroll patients into the trial may mean 
that many patients will receive the 
inferior standard treatment [13,14]. 
The ﬁ  rst randomized controlled 
trial of circumcision for preventing 
heterosexual transmission of HIV, 
for example, was terminated early 
after the interim analysis showed that 
circumcised men were less likely to 
be infected with HIV [15]. However, 
if a study is wrongly terminated for 
presumed beneﬁ  ts, this could result 
in adoption of a new therapy of 
questionable efﬁ  cacy [13,14].
We now illustrate these issues 
by considering a clinical research 
hypothesis: is radiotherapy plus 
chemotherapy (combined Rx) 
superior to radiotherapy alone (RT) 
in the management of cancer of the 
esophagus? (see Box 1). We consider 
two scenarios: (1) the best-case scenario 
(B/H = 13.5), and (2) the worst-case 
scenario (B/H = 1.4). The probability 
that the research ﬁ  nding is true [16,17] 
(i.e., that combined treatment is truly 
better than radiotherapy alone) under 
the best-case scenario is 95% [95% 
conﬁ  dence interval (CI), 89%–99.9%]. 
Under the worst-case scenario, the 
probability that combined treatment is 
better than radiotherapy alone is 80% 
[95% CI, 61%–99%]. The threshold 
probability above which these ﬁ  ndings 
should be accepted is 7% [95% CI, 
0%–30%] if we assume that B/H = 
13.5, or 41% [95% CI, 11%–72%] if we 
assume B/H = 1.4 (Table 1).
The results indicate that in the 
best-case scenario, the probability 
that the research ﬁ  ndings are true far 
exceeds the threshold above which the 
results should be accepted (i.e., PPV is 
greater than pt). Therefore, rationally, 
in this case we should not hesitate to 
accept the ﬁ  ndings from this study as 
truthful. However, in the worst-case 
scenario, the lower limit of the PPV’s 
95% conﬁ  dence interval intersects 
with the upper limit of the threshold’s 
95% conﬁ  dence interval, indicating 
that under these circumstances the 
research hypothesis may not be 
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040026.g001
Figure 1. The Threshold Probability Above (Pt in Red) Which We Should Accept Findings of 
Research Hypothesis as Being True
The horizontal yellow line indicates the actual conditional probability that the research hypothesis 
is true in the case of positive ﬁ  ndings. This means that for beneﬁ  t/harm ratios above the threshold 
(1.5 in this example), the research hypothesis can be accepted.
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acceptable (since PPV is possibly less 
than pt). Had the investigators made a 
mistake when they terminated the trial 
early?
Dealing with Unavoidable 
Erroneous Research Findings
Mistakes are an integral part of 
research. Positive research ﬁ  ndings 
may subsequently be shown to be 
false [18]. When we accept that our 
initially positive research ﬁ  ndings 
were in fact false, we may discover 
that another alternative (i.e., the 
null hypothesis) would have been 
preferable [7,19–21]. When an initially 
positive research ﬁ  nding turns out 
to be false, this may bring a sense of 
loss or regret [19,20,22,23]. However, 
abundant experience has shown that 
there are many situations in which 
we can tolerate wrong decisions, and 
others in which we cannot [2]. We 
have previously described the concept 
of acceptable regret, i.e., under certain 
conditions making a wrong decision 
will not be particularly burdensome to 
the decision maker [2].
Deﬁ  ning Tolerable Limits for 
Accepting Potentially False Results
We now apply the concept of 
acceptable regret to address the 
question of whether potentially false 
research ﬁ  ndings should be tolerated. 
In other words: which decision 
(regarding a research hypothesis) 
should we make if we want to 
ensure that the regret is less than a 
predetermined (minimal acceptable) 
regret, R0 [2]? (R0 denotes acceptable 
regret and should be expressed in the 
same units as beneﬁ  ts and harms).
It can easily be shown that we should 
be willing to accept the results of 
potentially false research ﬁ  ndings as 
long as the posterior probability of 
it being true is above the acceptable 
regret threshold probability, pr (see 
Equation 3, Appendix, and Equations 
A3 and A4):
        
  
(3)
where r is the amount of acceptable 
regret expressed as a percentage of 
the beneﬁ  ts that we are willing to lose 
in case our decision proves to be the 
wrong one (i.e.,  ).
This equation describes the effect 
of acceptable regret on the threshold 
probability (Equation 1) in such a 
way that the PPV now also needs to 
be above the threshold deﬁ  ned in 
Equation 3 for the research results to 
become acceptable.
Note that actions under expected 
utility theory (EUT) and acceptable 
regret may not necessary be identical, 
but arguably the most rational course 
of action would be to select those 
The Radiation Oncology Cooperative 
Group conducted a randomized 
controlled trial to evaluate the effects 
of combined chemotherapy and 
radiotherapy versus radiotherapy 
alone in patients with cancer of the 
esophagus [28].
A sample size of 150 patients was 
planned to detect an improvement 
in the two-year survival rate from 
10%–30% in favor of combined Rx (at 
α = 0.05 and β = 0.10). At the interim 
analysis, 88% of patients in the control 
group (RT) had died while only 59% in 
the experimental arm (combined Rx) had 
died, resulting in a survival advantage of 
29% in favor of combined Rx (p < 0.001).
For this reason, the trial was 
terminated prematurely after enrolling 
121 patients. Two percent of patients 
died as a result of treatment in the 
combined Rx group versus 0% in the RT 
arm. Thus, the observed net beneﬁ  t/harm 
ratio in this trial was [88-59-2]/2 = 13.5 
[29] (the best-case scenario).
For our worst-case scenario we 
assume that two-thirds of patients who 
experienced life-threatening toxicities 
with combined Rx (12%) will have died. 
This will result in the worst-case net 
beneﬁ  t/harms ratio = (88-59-12)/12 = 
1.4.
The trial was stopped using classic 
inferential statistics which indicated 
that the probability of the observed 
results, assuming the null hypothesis 
that combined Rx is equivalent to RT, 
was extremely small (p < 0.001). This, 
however, tells us nothing about how 
true the alternative hypothesis is [16,17], 
i.e., in our case, what is the probability 
that combined Rx is better than RT? The 
probability that the research ﬁ  nding 
is true [16,17] (i.e., that combined Rx is 
truly better treatment than RT) under 
the best-case scenario is 95% [95% 
CI, 89%–99.9%]. Under the worst-case 
scenario, the probability that combined 
Rx is better than RT is 80% [95% CI, 
61%–99%].
Box 1. Is Combined Chemotherapy Plus Radiotherapy Superior 
To Radiotherapy Alone for Treating Esophageal Cancer?
Table 1. How True Is the Research Hypothesis that Combined Chemotherapy Is Superior To Radiotherapy Alone in the 
Management of Esophageal Cancer? 
Net Beneﬁ  ts 
(Survival; %)a
Net Harms 
(Treatment-Related 
Mortality; %)a
Beneﬁ  t/Harms 
Ratio
Type I (α) 
Error (%)
Type II (β) 
Error (%)
The Threshold Probability 
Above Which Research 
Hypothesis Should Be 
Accepted as True Findings 
(%)
Probability that 
Research Hypothesis 
Is True (%)
[88-59-2]b = 27% 2 13.5 5 10   7% [0%–30%] 95% 
[89%–99.9%]d
[88-59-12]c = 17% 12 1.4 5 20 41% [11%–72%] 80%e 
[61%–99%]
Derived from [28].
a Calculated as described in [29]. 
b Best-case scenario.
c Worst-case scenario.
d Assumes 50% prior probability.
e Assumes 20% prior probability (see Supplementary Information for details).
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040026.t001
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Table 2. Probability that Research Findings Are True and Beneﬁ  t/Harms Ratio Above Which Findings May Become Acceptable
Type of Research Probability that 
Findings Are Truea (%)
Minimum Beneﬁ  t/Harms 
Ratio Above Which 
Research Hypothesis Can 
Be Acceptable
(No Regret Taken Into 
Account)
Acceptable Regretb for 
Wrongly Accepting 
Research Hypothesis (%)
Minimum Beneﬁ  t/Harms 
Ratio Above Which 
Alternative Hypothesis Can 
Be Acceptable
(When Acceptable Regretb 
Is Taken Into Account)
Adequately powered RCT with little 
bias and 1:1: pre-study odds (β = 20%)
85 0.18 1 15
20 0.75
30 0.5
40 0.38
60 0.25
80 0.19
Conﬁ  rmatory meta-analysis of good 
quality RCTs (β = 5%)
85 0.18 1 15
20 0.75
30 0.5
40 0.38
60 0.25
80 0.19
Meta-analysis of small inconclusive 
studies (β = 20%)
41 1.44 1 59
20 2.95
30 1.97
40 1.48
60 0.98
80 0.74
Underpowered, but well-performed 
phase I/II RCT (β = 80%)
23 3.35 1 77
20 3.85
30 2.57
40 1.93
60 1.28
80 0.96
Underpowered, poorly performed 
phase I/II RCT (β = 80%)
17 4.88 1 83
20 4.15
30 2.77
40 2.08
60 1.38
80 1.04
Adequately powered exploratory 
epidemiological study (β = 20%)
20 4 1 80
20 4
30 2.67
40 2
60 1.33
80 1
Underpowered exploratory 
epidemiological study (β = 80%)
12 7.33 1 88
20 4.4
30 2.93
40 2.2
60 1.47
80 1.1
Discovery-oriented exploratory 
research with massive testing (β = 80%)
0.10 999 19 9
20 5
30 3.33
40 2.5
60 1.67
80 1.25
Figures in red: applies only if a decision maker is willing to violate precepts of rational decision making under expected utility theory; otherwise under these circumstances research 
hypothesis never becomes acceptable. (Research may become acceptable if regret is smaller than the values pre-speciﬁ  ed in the table; see text of article (Equation 4) and Text S1 for a 
longer version of the paper.)
a Data from [1].
b Expressed as r = 1%, 20%, etc. of beneﬁ  ts (i.e., percentage of beneﬁ  ts that we can tolerate losing in case we wrongly accept research ﬁ  ndings).
RCT, randomized controlled trial
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040026.t002
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research ﬁ  ndings with the highest 
expected utility while keeping regret 
below the acceptable levels. The 
supplementary material (a longer 
version of the paper and Appendix) 
show that the maximum possible 
fraction of beneﬁ  ts that we can forgo 
(and still be wrong) while at the same 
time adhering to the precepts of EUT 
is given by (see Appendix, Equations 
A3–A6):
                 
(4)
A practical interpretation of this 
inequality is that some research ﬁ  ndings 
may never become acceptable unless we 
are ready to violate the axioms of EUT, 
i.e., accept value r to be larger than 
deﬁ  ned in Equation 4 (Table 2).
We return now to the “real life” 
scenario above, i.e., the dilemma 
of whether to stop a clinical trial 
early. In our worst-case analysis (Box 
1), we found that the probability 
that combined Rx is better than 
radiotherapy alone could potentially 
be as low as 80% [95% CI, 61%–99%]. 
This ﬁ  gure overlaps with the probability 
of the threshold of 41% [95% CI, 
11%–72%] above which research 
ﬁ  ndings are acceptable under the worst 
case scenario (see Table 1) (i.e., PPV 
is possibly less than pt; see Equations 
1 and 2). Thus, it is quite conceivable 
that the investigators made a mistake 
when they closed the trial prematurely.
One way to handle situations 
in which evidence is not solidly 
established is to explicitly take into 
account the possibility that one can 
make a mistake and wrongly accept 
the results of a research hypothesis. 
Accepting this possibility can, in 
turn, help us determine “decision 
thresholds” that will take into account 
the amount of error which may or may 
not be particularly troublesome to us if 
we wrongly accept research ﬁ  ndings.
Let us assume that the investigators 
in the esophageal cancer trial are 
prepared to accept that they may be 
wrong and that they were willing to 
forgo 10%, 30%, or 67% of beneﬁ  ts. 
Using Equation 3, the calculations 
in Box 2 and Figure 2 show that for 
any willingness to tolerate loss of 
net beneﬁ  ts of greater than 10%, 
the probability that combined Rx is 
superior to RT is above all decision 
thresholds (since pr = 0 in best-case 
scenario; Equation 3). Therefore the 
investigators seemed to have been 
correct when they terminated the trial 
earlier than originally anticipated.
Threshold Probabilities in Various 
Types of Clinical Research
Table 2 summarizes the results of most 
types of clinical research showing the 
probabilities that the research ﬁ  ndings 
are true and the beneﬁ  t/harms ratio 
above which the ﬁ  ndings become 
acceptable. For each type of research, 
the table shows these probabilities with 
and without acceptable regret being 
taken into account. What is remarkable 
is that depending on the amount of 
acceptable regret, our acceptance of 
potentially false research ﬁ  ndings may 
dramatically change. For example, 
in the case of a meta-analysis of small 
inconclusive studies, we can accept the 
research hypothesis as true only if B/H 
> 1.44. However, if we are willing to 
forgo, say, only 1% of the net beneﬁ  ts 
in case we prove to be mistaken, the B/
H ratio for accepting the ﬁ  ndings from 
the meta-analysis of small inconclusive 
studies dramatically increases to 59.
Conclusion
In the ﬁ  nal analysis, the answer to the 
question posed in the title of this paper, 
“When should potentially false research 
ﬁ  ndings be considered acceptable?” 
has much to do with our beliefs about 
what constitutes knowledge itself [24]. 
The answer depends on the question of 
how much we are willing to tolerate the 
research results being wrong. Equation 
3 shows an important result: if we are 
not willing to accept any possibility 
that our decision to accept a research 
ﬁ  nding could be wrong (r = 0), that 
would mean that we can operate only 
at absolute certainty in the “truth” of a 
research hypothesis (i.e., PPV = 100%). 
This is clearly not an attainable goal 
[1]. Therefore, our acceptability of 
“truth” depends on how much we care 
about being wrong. In our attempts 
to balance these tradeoffs, the value 
that we place on beneﬁ  ts, harms, and 
degrees of errors that we can tolerate 
becomes crucial.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.0040026.g002
Figure 2. The Threshold Probability (Pt) Above Which We Should Accept Findings of 
Research Hypothesis as Being True (Pink Line) as a Function of Beneﬁ  t/Harm Ratio
The calculated (acceptable regret) threshold above which we should accept research ﬁ  ndings is 
shown for the worst-case scenario (B/H = 1.4; see text for details) with a (hypothetical) assumption 
that we are willing to forgo 30% of the beneﬁ  ts (slanted line). The calculated threshold probability 
(acceptable regret threshold) has a value of 58% when B/H = 1.4 (the horizontal line). This means 
that as long as the probability that research ﬁ  ndings are true is above this acceptable regret 
threshold, these research ﬁ  ndings could be accepted with tolerable amount of regret in case 
the research hypothesis proves to be wrong (for didactic purposes only one acceptable regret 
threshold is shown). See Box 2 and text for details.
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However, because a typical clinical 
research hypothesis is formulated to test 
for beneﬁ  ts, we have here postulated 
a relationship between acceptable regret 
and the fraction of beneﬁ  ts that we 
are willing to forgo in the case of false 
research ﬁ  ndings. Unfortunately, when 
we move outside the realm of medical 
treatments and interventions, the 
immediate and long-term harms and 
beneﬁ  ts are very difﬁ  cult to quantify. 
On occasion, wrongly adopting some 
false positive ﬁ  ndings may lead to the 
adoption of other false ﬁ  ndings, thus 
creating ﬁ  elds replete with spurious 
claims. One typical example is the use 
of stem cell transplant for breast cancer, 
which resulted in tens of thousands of 
women getting aggressive, toxic, and 
very expensive treatment based on 
strong beliefs obtained in early phase 
I/II trials until controlled, randomized 
trials demonstrated no beneﬁ  ts 
but increased harms of stem cell 
transplants compared with conventional 
chemotherapy [25]. Therefore, even 
for clinical medicine, where beneﬁ  ts 
and harms are more typically measured, 
we should acknowledge that often 
the quality of the information on 
harms is suboptimal [26]. There is 
no guarantee that the “beneﬁ  ts” will 
exceed the “harms.” Although (as 
noted in Text S1) there is nothing to 
prevent us from relating R0 to harms, 
or both beneﬁ  ts and harms, one must 
acknowledge that there is much more 
uncertainty, often total ignorance, about 
harms (since data on harms is often 
limited). As a consequence, under these 
circumstances research may become 
acceptable only if we relax our criteria 
for acceptable regret, i.e., accept value 
r to be larger than deﬁ  ned in Equation 
4. In other words, unless we are ready to 
violate the precepts of rational decision 
making (see the ﬁ  gures in red in Table 
2), a research ﬁ  nding with low PPV (the 
majority of research ﬁ  ndings) should 
not be accepted [1].
We conclude that since obtaining 
the absolute “truth” in research is 
impossible, society has to decide when 
less-than-perfect results may become 
acceptable. The approach presented 
here, advocating that the research 
hypothesis should be accepted when 
it is coherent with beliefs “upon which 
a man is prepared to act” [27], may 
facilitate decision making in scientiﬁ  c 
research.  
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